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BOOK REVIEWS
tables and saltwater intrusion, millions of acres of farmland have been
permanently abandoned throughout northwestern Mexico and the
American Southwest. In the Sonoran Desert, about 60 percent of the
native vegetation has been converted or destroyed, and nearly all of its
rivers have been diverted or dried up over the past century. In Arizona,
only ten percent of the historic riparian habitat still survives. These
landscape-scale changes in southwestern deserts have become an
integral part of the region's ecological fabric and they cannot be ignored
without giving false impressions.
Richard C. Brusca, PhD
Director of Conservation and Science
Arizona-Sonora Desert Museum
2021 N. Kinney Rd.
Tucson, AZ 85743-8918
Silent Spill: The Organization of an Industrial Crisis. By Thomas D.
Beamish. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2002. Pp. 220. $21.95 softcover.
Invisible oil spills sit silently among us. Unable to capture our
imagination with a photo of a tanker stranded on the rocks or the
plaintive cry of an oil-soaked bird, these faceless spills continue for years.
Those with the power to stop these unheard and unseen spills do
nothing. In Silent Spill, Beamish introduces us to the granddaddy of all
"silent spills"-the Guadalupe Dunes oil spill in California. He explains
how such spills happen, but not from the traditional focus on ruptured
pipelines or corroded tanks. Beamish describes, instead, the societal
mechanisms at work in oil companies, government bureaucracies, and
communities that aid and abet these silent spills and allow them to
worsen long after they are discovered.
The Guadalupe Dunes sit on the California Coast about 170
miles north of Los Angeles. There, workers at a Unocal oil field spilled
various oil products, quietly and chronically, for 38 years. The quantity
spilled (10-20 million gallons) exceeded the amount spilled by the Exxon
Valdez. But while the fouling of Alaska's Prince William Sound was
national news and generated hundreds of stories, the Guadalupe Dunes
spill, discovered during the same period, generated only nine stories
between 1990 and 1996. Beamish analyzes why such spills generate so
little news and why society does not stop them from continuing when
they are first discovered.
Beamish begins by naming this problem--crescive troubles. Such
troubles overcome us with stealthy, tiny increments that do not call
attention to the larger picture. One increment is unworthy of attention.
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The relentless accumulation of incremental steps eventually becomes a
crisis beyond our ability to solve. The impossibility of solving the
problem discourages us further, so the crisis grows, even larger. This
scenario describes crescive troubles and explains how an oil spill bigger
than the spill from the Exxon Valdez saturated a six-square-mile area of
California without ever being newsworthy.
Beamish begins by noting that we treat land spills very
differently from marine spills. Oil spills happen on land 700 times more
frequently than marine spills. Even so, while legislation has successfully
reduced marine oil spills by 50 percent, regulation for land spills remains
largely ineffective. More than 300,000 U.S. land sites have dangerously
polluted soil and groundwater that will cost an estimated $9 billion
dollars to clean up. Why, Beamish asks, with a problem of this
magnitude, does it garner so little public attention? Why don't we
intervene sooner and more effectively?
Beamish identifies three groups in society who could have raised
the alarm about the Guadalupe spill earlier but did not-first, the'
workers at the oil field; second, the government regulators who
inspected the Unocal operation; and third, community members. His
analysis of oil workers and regulators revealed a fundamental flaw in
our regulatory process.
Beamish studied the sociological structure of oil field communi-
ties. Oil work is often isolated. The oil company pays well above the
usual rate available for unskilled labor. At Guadalupe Dunes, field
workers began their careers as unskilled utility men and worked their
way up through the hierarchy. The lower levels of the hierarchy had no
authority to report the spills, which were everyday occurrences and were
readily apparent to a newcomer. Once a utility worker progressed to a
level where he had authority to make an issue of the spilling, spills were
part of the normal routine and no longer worthy of notice. By the time a
worker attained a position with responsibility to report spills, he could
not raise the alarm without also raising difficult questions as to why he
had not reported the spills earlier. Thus, a conspiracy of silence
developed in which Unocal oil workers did nothing to call attention to
routine spills of as much as 200 barrels of oil a day.
If it was too much to ask powerless oil workers to pose hard
questions, what of government regulators? Beamish gives a historical
perspective that explains some of the lack of early regulatory response.
In 1952, when the leaks probably began, chronic oil leaks were neither
newsworthy, nor regulated. In the 1970s, public perception had changed,
yet the leaks continued. The incremental nature of the spilling escaped
control by a regulatory apparatus designed to handle "emergencies."
Regulators later explained their failure to intervene sooner by saying that
the spill was not a "tanker on the rocks." Such comments, combined with
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his study of oil workers, ledBeamish to suggest one cause of inadequate
response to such spills.
Beamish explains that oil spills are self-reported by companies. A
company whose tanker is on the rocks has little choice about whether to
report it. The problem will be obvious.,soon enough. Smaller spills are
different.
A small spill may never be detected. If enough time goes by, it
may be difficult to determine who is responsible for multiple small spills.
The anonymity of the multiple small spills at Guadalupe Dunes made
the origin difficult to discern. As the spills accumulated and became
progressively more obvious, Unocal actively misled officials and denied
that the oil originated from their operations. This further delayed
effective regulatory response. Regulators, lacking an "emergency," failed
to do an independent investigation. of Unocal's explanation. Beamish
suggests that this sequence of events should cause us to question the
effectiveness of self-reporting, particularly in such a hierarchical, insular
industry. In the case of Guadalupe Dunes, gullible regulators and a
deceptive company allowed the leaks to continue.
The first Unocal whistleblower stepped forward in 1990 but the
silent nature of the spill failed to energize officials. Beamish explains this
inaction by noting that regulators usually respond to an obvious oil spill
such as a stranded tanker, not to a slow, invisible, pervasive leak. He
contrasts marine spills, where the Coast Guard has clear regulatory
authority, to a spill like the Guadalupe Dunes spill, where 18 different
agencies had some form of jurisdiction- and no one was in charge. Finally,
a second whistleblower stepped forward and described where to find
incriminating evidence in Unocal's offices.
Galvanized by the discovery of Unocal's duplicity, the regulators
still had no tools with which to remediate the spill. Beamish asks, how
does one "clean up" a largely underground spill that extends over six
square miles? Agencies oriented to emergency response were ill suited to
long-term management of pervasive contamination. Beamish illustrates
the impotence of regulators when faced with a land-based spill and
contrasts that with their later response to a marine spill that resulted
from the land-based spill at Guadalupe Dunes.
Heavy winter rains brought on the marine spill. The rainfall
raised the water table, the rising water table lifted the underground oil to
the surface, and the rains carried it into the ocean. At last, the Coast
Guard had something that fit its preconceived notion of an "oil spill."
Relying on its sweeping regulatory authority originally granted to allow
it to quickly respond to stranded tankers, the Coast Guard unilaterally
decided to excavate a large section of beachfront to "clean" the oil soaked
sands. Beamish describes the Coast Guard's ineffective efforts as a
decision that destroyed the dunes in the process of "saving" them. He
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conveys the profound irony in the massive effort focused on a tiny
portion of beach while the vast majority of the spill sat silently next door
like a huge oil soaked sponge.
Regrettably, a duplicitous corporation and ineffective regulators
weren't enough to fully explain a spill of this size. Beamish focuses his
analysis on community members as well. Why didn't swimmers
complain more vociferously when ocean water burned their eyes and
filled their nostrils with the stench of petroleum and the waves frothed
with brown foam instead of white?
Here, the community's myth of San Luis Obispo County as a
clean place, not like the "big city" where many people came from,
proved its downfall. In truth, the county had been the focus of oil drilling
for years and was nowhere near as clean as the myth led people to
believe. The myth blinded people to the early signs of the spill and
caused community members to initially minimize the reality of the spill.
When they finally realized the truth, they were outraged at Unocal. The
ensuing litigation against Unocal and state officials was born of the loss
of public trust.
To summarize his analysis, Beamish identifies three factors that
prevent earlier intervention in these silent spills: first, the hierarchical
and insular nature of the industry; second, our regulatory apparatus that
depends on self-reporting; and third, community myths. Beamish reveals
that one result of the whistleblowers' efforts was that Unocal shut down
the oil field and everyone lost their job. He suggests that we are unwise
to depend on self-reporting in an industry where workers who report
spills may risk everyone's livelihood.
Potential readers should be warned that this is a book of
sociology, not technical information about the oil industry. This book
required perseverance and work. Nevertheless, Beamish managed to
make his points even to a reader who is not a sociologist by training. The
reward for persistence was a new perspective on oil contamination and a
considerably broader understanding of why such spills happen.
There are two shortcomings to Silent Spill. It desperately needs a
map. Not everyone is familiar enough with California geography to be
able to place this event in its proper geographic context. Although the
book starts out with text describing the location of the site, that was not
enough orientation. Later chapters refer to places such as San Luis
Obispo County, Avila Beach, and an oil spill off the Santa Barbara coast.
Clueless, I finally had to retrieve the road map of the western United
States from the car so that I could create a mental picture of the locations
of the events Beamish describes.
The second shortcoming to Silent Spill is its inadequate
description of the physical causes of the spill. Although this is a book
about sociology, not decrepit physical equipment, the magnitude of the
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spill provoked too many unanswered questions. It is only natural to
wonder how (in the physical sense) a 20 million gallon oil spill occurs
over 38 years. Minimal textual descriptions and a random endnote or
two left my curiosity unsatisfied. There should have been a short section
in the introduction that described the physical causes of the spill.
Other than these minor imperfections, Silent Spill was well-worth
reading. It provided a refreshing new look at "how" oil spills happen
and should be required reading for anyone interested in changing the
regulations that apply to oil spills. Understanding the social dynamics
inherent in these systems will inform legislators, regulators, and citizens
how to prevent future spills and craft more effective regulations.
Carol M. Parker
MS, University of Rochester
MBA, University of New Mexico
JD Candidate, University of New Mexico
The Greening of Conservative America. By John RIE. Bliese. Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, 2002. Pp. 339. $33.00 hardcover; $27.00 paper.
Anyone interested in American environmental policy will feel at
least a twinge of curiosity after reading the title of this book, The Greening
of Conservative America. The greening of what? Author John R.E. Bliese,
associate professor of communication studies at Texas Tech University,
took on an extraordinary task with this brave publication. You don't
have to be a professor or a politician to know that protection of our
environment and natural resources is generally a priority for those at the
left end of the political spectrum. The author challenges this
generalization on every page of his book. In The Greening of Conservative
America, Bliese, a self-declared conservative, not only calls for a
conservative environmental agenda but also presents conservative
programs to address environmental concerns. And, in his opinion, any
principled conservative should embrace his proposals because a failure
to do so would be a departure from the values most fundamental to
conservative beliefs.
The structure of the book is simple and well suited to promote
the author's innovative ideas and approaches to law and policy. Bliese
begins with a discussion of common misconceptions about
environmentalism and an explanation of fundamental conservative
principles. After laying this foundation, Bliese begins his examination of
current policies regarding a handful of environmental issues. And, of
course, he doesn't stop after examining current policy. At the heart of
this book are his strong suggestions for the agenda that conservatives
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